Simmering Unrest and Succession Challenges in Oman by Valeri, M
SIMMERING UNREST  
AND SUCCESSION 
CHALLENGES IN OMAN
Marc Valeri
JA N UA RY  2 01 5
CarnegieEndowment.org
B E I J I N G       B E I R U T       B R U S S E L S       M O S C O W       WA S H I N G TO N
 SIMMERING UNREST 
 AND SUCCESSION
CHALLENGES IN OMAN
Marc Valeri
© 2015 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views 
represented herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by 
any means without permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment. Please 
direct inquiries to:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Publications Department 
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC 20036 
P: +1 202 483 7600 
F: +1 202 483 1840 
CarnegieEndowment.org
This publication can be downloaded at no cost 
at CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs.
CP 223
Contents
About the Author v
Summary 1
Introduction 3
The Foundations of Contemporary Oman 4
Deep-Seated Issues 6
Breaking the Fear Barrier  8
The Regime Reacts 11
Limited Institutional Concessions 14
Continuing Unrest 17
The Regional Context 20
The Need to Open a New Chapter 21
Conclusion 24
Notes 27
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 32

vAbout the Author
Marc Valeri is a senior lecturer of political economy at the Institute of Arab 
and Islamic Studies (IAIS) and director of the Center for Gulf Studies at the 
University of Exeter. His current research focuses on the social, political, and 
economic transformations in the Gulf monarchies as well as nation building 
and political legitimacy in the Sultanate of Oman since 1970.
 
He was a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute of Florence 
from 2005 to 2006 and Marie Curie Research Fellow at the IAIS from 2007 to 
2009. In 2009–2010, Valeri was a teaching fellow in politics and constitutional 
law at the University of La Rochelle (France) and was concomitantly honorary 
research fellow at the IAIS. 
Nizwa
Huwaysah
Ad Duqm
Hayma
Kalban
Dawkah
Sharkh
Rakhyut
Shuwamiyah
Thamarit
Sadh
Sirab
Taqah
Ibri
Mina as
Sultan Qabus
Diba al Hisn
Madha
Khasab
Khuwayr
Ashkharah
Saham
OMAN
D H O FA R
A L W U S TA
A’ D H A H I R A H
Salalah
Sur
A’ S H A R Q I YA H
S O U T H
A’ D A K -
H I L I YA H
( I n t e r i o r )
A R A B I A N
S E A
P E R S I A N  G U L F
GU L F  O F  O M A N
Strait of Hormuz
Khalij
Masirah
Ghubbat
Sawqirah
SAUDI 
ARABIA
UNITED  ARAB 
EMIRATES
IRAN
YEMEN
A’ S H A R Q I YA H
N O RT H
A L B U R A I M I
M U S A N D A M
M U S C AT
A L B AT I N A H  N O RT H
A L B AT I N A H  S O U T H
Masira
Kuria Muria
Islands
A R  R
U B '
 A L
 KH
A L
I
Sohar
Shinas
Al Buraimi
Muscat
LUCIDITY INFORMATION DESIGN, LLC
National capital
Town or village
Highway and
major road
Region and gover-
norate boundary
International
boundary
0
0 300 km
200 mi
SOMALIA
DJIBOUTI
YEMEN
SAUDI
ARABIA
IRAN
KUWAIT
QATAR
UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES
BAHRAIN
OM
AN
ETHIOPIA
ERITREA 
Arabian
Sea
Persian Gulf
Red Sea
 
0
0 500 km
400 mi
1Summary
The uncertain health of the sultan of Oman has heightened concern about the 
future of the country, the most personalized of all Gulf monarchies. Many 
Omanis have long equated the country with its ruler, Qaboos bin Said Al Said, 
who won their loyalty by building up a state and a national identity centered 
on himself. However, amid mounting popular frustration, criticism of Qaboos 
has emerged, as has anxiety about what will follow his reign. There are several 
measures the regime can undertake to avoid further unrest.
A New Environment
• The Omani model of political legitimacy is intimately linked to Qaboos. 
But the country’s young population feels less indebted to the ruler, and an 
increasingly vocal civil society has been complaining about deep-seated 
flaws in the state he built after taking power in 1970.
• In 2011 and 2012, most major towns saw peaceful protests by Omanis 
demanding higher salaries, better living conditions, substantial political 
reforms, and the end of corruption.
• The regime responded with a combination of economic gestures, firings 
of some top officials, and the detention of peaceful activists. Since 2012, 
repressive measures have become more prominent, with new investments 
in the security sector and crackdowns on dissonant voices.
• Political parties are prohibited in Oman and, despite some cosmetic 
reforms, nearly all power remains with the monarch. 
• While the protests did not initially target the sultan, criticism of Qaboos 
and his practices has become more common. Protesters are worried about 
the future of the country and are speaking out on its behalf.
Changes Are Needed to Avoid Further Unrest
Oman’s leaders should recognize that the environment has changed. 
Young Omanis will not be willing to grant the next ruler the same degree of 
control that their parents granted Qaboos. Instead, Qaboos’s successor is likely 
to face renewed demands for reform.
Limits on civil society should be relaxed. Rather than actively harassing and 
repressing peaceful alternative voices, the regime should encourage civil society 
organizations, a step toward allowing some public participation in governance. 
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Answers to political uncertainties should be provided. The regime’s reluc-
tance to appoint a prime minister or a crown prince with some executive pow-
ers and to prepare for a post-Qaboos Oman has only fueled popular anxiety 
over the perceived lack of a long-term economic and political vision for the 
country. If the current ruler does not provide answers to these questions soon, 
the uncertainty could provoke considerable turmoil in the event of Qaboos’s 
sudden demise.
3Introduction
The sultan of Oman traveled to Germany to receive medical care in July 2014. 
His prolonged stay since then has revived concerns across Omani society about 
the future of the country without the “father of the nation.”1 A taped, four-min-
ute television address in early November by Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said—
who looked emaciated and expressed regret that he was unable to return home 
for National Day celebrations later in the month—failed to silence rumors of 
cancer that have been circulating in the Gulf since he left the country.
The anxiety about the health of the seventy-four-year-old ruler, who has no 
designated heir, came as the supposed “sleepy sultanate,”2 long thought to be a 
model of stability, was affected by the winds of protest blowing across the region.
In 2011 and 2012, the sultanate of Oman experienced its widest popular 
protests since the 1970s and the end of the Dhofar war, in which the southern 
region rose up against Qaboos’s father, who then ruled the country.3 Peaceful 
sit-ins that went on for two months in early 2011, and sustained mobilizations 
calling for political reforms in the summer of 2012, illustrated the depth of 
the frustration and social malaise in the country. The protesters’ key demands 
included expanded job opportunities, curbs on corruption among top officials, 
and programs to combat increasing inequality. In the vast majority of cases, the 
ruler was not their target.
The regime’s response—a combination of economic concessions, modest 
political reforms, and tough security measures—was not enough to quell the 
protests. Furthermore, the government’s unwillingness to break the taboo on 
key issues such as the concentration of power in the sultan’s hands and the 
need to establish the foundations for governance of a post-Qaboos Oman also 
revealed new tensions, as young activists began to make a distinction between 
the current regime and the Omani nation.
That connection between Qaboos and the state has been at the heart of his 
rule since the sultan took power in 1970. Relying on the country’s oil revenues, 
the sultan asserted his legitimacy by implementing an ambitious policy of 
national unification and by creating a vast pool of civil servants who depended 
on the regime for their survival. Alongside that, the 1996 Basic Law sanctions 
a paternalistic state whose guide is the sultan, “the symbol of national unity 
as well as its guardian and defender,” who concurrently holds the positions of 
prime minister, commander in chief of the armed forces, chairman of the cen-
tral bank, and minister of defense, foreign affairs, and finance. Only a handful 
of individuals have direct access to the ruler, who has made clear since 2011 
that he intends to remain the sole arbiter of national priorities.
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While the protests in Oman have obviously not developed with the same 
intensity and on the same scale as other uprisings in the Arab world, they have 
revealed how this hypercentralized model has long since reached its limits.
The Omani Spring is the most serious alarm bell rung by a population that 
is both increasingly unable to meet the requirements of daily life and aware of 
the prospect of a challenging future without the paternal figure of Qaboos.4 
This brutal collision with reality marks the beginning of a new chapter in 
Oman’s history.
The Foundations of Contemporary Oman
Qaboos is the fourteenth ruler of the al-Busaidi dynasty of Oman. He over-
threw his father Said bin Taimur with the help of British advisers in 1970, 
when about fifteen years of civil war had been highlighting the social and 
political divisions of a territory marked by extreme international isolation. The 
new ruler, who was not yet thirty years old, inherited a territory without a state. 
His room to maneuver with regard to the British was reduced to a minimum, 
and so was his legitimacy vis-à-vis the Omanis. He thus immediately faced 
the need to assert the legitimacy of his accession to the throne by defining a 
new order for which he alone would hold the keys. The 
new regime’s strategy of legitimization linked the coun-
try’s economic and social development to the state, on the 
one hand, and to the person of the sultan, who has since 
become the subject of a personality cult, on the other.
The regime’s approach was based on the exploitation of 
a newly significant oil rent. The inexhaustible pool of jobs 
offered by the public sector, following the explosion of oil 
revenues, represented a decisive step in confirming the sul-
tan’s political legitimacy and hence his sociopolitical grip. 
Thousands of new state employees in the national army, the police, the intel-
ligence service, the ministries, and other parts of government were, for several 
decades, the most reliable and pragmatic allies of the ruler.
Moreover, thanks to new, paved roads, and to schools and health centers 
that were built in even the smallest villages, the state materially and symboli-
cally came to occupy all of its territory. It suddenly became a concrete real-
ity—the interlocutor for all government activity and the stage for all social and 
political actors. As a result, since the late 1970s, not only have a large majority 
of Omanis been dependent on the state for their own subsistence, but any 
alternative to the sultan has had no credibility.
A new official historiography has been built around Qaboos and the welfare 
state, one that ignores both the explosion in oil revenue that made it possible 
and the political continuity before and after 1970. The contemporary national 
identity is built on the negation of the country’s pre-1970 history, which is 
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never mentioned other than to contrast it with the glorious “national awak-
ening” of July 23, 1970, the date of Qaboos’s accession to the throne, later 
renamed Renaissance Day (id al-nahda).
This political rewriting of history, in which the ruler is omnipresent, marks 
an attempt to naturalize the special pantheon—the contemporary sultanate 
of Oman, the welfare state, and the person of Sultan Qaboos himself—that 
has been the basis for the current regime’s legitimacy. All major contempo-
rary urban achievements bear the sultan’s name. He is glorified in the national 
anthem and on National Day—the sultan’s birthday. The extreme personaliza-
tion of Oman’s political power is also seen in the country’s political system. In 
1975, sultan’s decree number 26/75 established that the sultan is “the source 
of all laws” (masdar al-qawanin). Since then, all Omani legislation has been 
promulgated through sultan’s decrees—including the Basic Law of the State, 
issued in November 1996.
The extreme personalization of Oman’s political system since 1970 accus-
tomed many Omanis to the idea that the fate of all Qaboos’s subjects depends 
on his goodwill. A climate of national unanimity predominated in the media 
and in officials’ public speeches, while Omanis have been told for forty years to 
rely on the reassuring paternal figure of the sultan to resolve all public matters. 
Even cabinet members have been afraid to speak up and displease the ruler, as 
they have operated in a culture of political insecurity that has been maintained 
in order to ensure everyone has internalized the fact that no position can be 
taken for granted. As a retired senior civil servant explained: 
When you speak to ministers or to high officials, they know the problems 
better than you. But they don’t want to hear because they are afraid. . . . They 
have not seen the sultan for one, two, three years, and they feel totally isolated. 
They don’t trust anybody and they don’t want to take the risk of making you 
believe that they are weak or vulnerable.5
This isolation means that very few people are willing or able to report issues 
to the ruler. Local observers explain, for instance, that a number of ministers 
were dismissed in March 2011, well after the start of protests around the coun-
try, because they were afraid to report the actual situation on the ground, wor-
ried that they would be reprimanded or lose face and position.
Civil wars in Yemen or Iraq, as well as the political instability in Kuwait 
and Bahrain, have frequently been used to put the extreme personalization of 
power in Muscat in perspective. As the explanation goes, despite the system’s 
imperfections, Omani political stability is still preferable to the state of entropy 
in neighboring countries.
Similarly, the idea that supposedly liberal leaders have to face a tribal and 
conservative society is used as a misleading but handy excuse to justify, espe-
cially to their U.S. and European counterparts, any delays in political liber-
alization. The argument that the people are “not mature for Western-type 
democracy” was used by Qaboos in 1973 to justify the personalization of his 
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rule,6 and he repeated it almost word for word in 1997: “The man in the street 
often doesn’t want or know how to deal with foreign governments or defend 
the country. He trusts me to do it. . . . In this part of the world, giving too 
much power too fast can still be exploited. Elections in many countries mean 
having the army prevent bloodshed. Is this democracy? Are these happy coun-
tries? . . . No. They are really just power struggles. I am against creating such 
situations when people aren’t ready for them.”7  
Deep-Seated Issues
Oman’s état de grâce has long since come to an end. While regional dynamics 
clearly had an impact on the events that shook the sultanate after 2011, a series 
of domestic challenges have been calling into question the Omani sociopoliti-
cal order for more than fifteen years.
The Omani population is one of the youngest in the world: 45 percent of 
nationals were less than twenty years old and 56 percent were less than twenty-
five in 2013.8 As this huge contingent of young people joins the labor market, 
the economy remains extremely dependent on oil-derived revenue. In 2013, the 
oil and natural gas sectors accounted for 45 percent of the Omani gross domestic 
product (GDP) and 86 percent of government revenues.9
Given Oman’s limited oil and gas resources compared 
to its neighbors, a long-term economic program was estab-
lished in 1995 that included economic diversification 
among its goals. Under Oman 2020: Vision for Oman’s 
Economy, the oil sector’s share of the country’s GDP was 
to fall from 41 percent in 1996 to 9 percent by 2020, 
while that of nonoil industries was to increase from 7.5 percent to 29 percent. 
Separately, the sixth (2001–2005) and seventh (2006–2010) five-year plans 
emphasized development in three main areas: the gas sector, tourism, and non-
oil industries. This policy also focused on the private sector as “the main con-
tributor of growth,”10 and it aimed to both attract foreign capital and support 
the role of local companies in economic diversification.
Another priority of the Oman 2020 economic road map was human 
resources and employment. The rates of nationals working in the public and 
private sectors was to increase from 68 percent to 95 percent and from 7.5 
percent to 75 percent, respectively, while the share of expatriates in the whole 
population was to be reduced from 25 percent in 1995 to 15 percent by 2020.
However, policies favoring Omani nationals in employment have had lim-
ited results, and the process of diversifying sources of revenue has been slow. 
This is illustrated by Oman’s dramatic social inequalities, endemic unemploy-
ment, and poverty, all results of recent deregulation and privatization policies.
When protests started in January 2011, estimates at the national level 
showed a persistent 20 percent unemployment rate among nationals—and 
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it was certainly above 25 percent among eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds. 
These figures leave unacknowledged what is probably a considerable rate of 
underemployment, particularly in rural areas. In February 2011, the propor-
tion of Omanis employed in the private sector and earning less than the official 
monthly minimum wage (about $520, or 200 Omani rials11) was 70 percent.12
Moreover, the personal involvement of most influential decisionmakers and 
cabinet members in business has fueled the widespread perception of an elite 
busy safeguarding its privileges while silencing questions about the conflict 
between the nation’s general interests they are supposed to promote—such as 
Omanization policies of employment—and the particular stakes they defend 
as businessmen. The sultan has not prevented Oman’s merchant families from 
taking political positions and actively participating in the setting of economic 
priorities. Qaboos has never been willing to rely on his small family, leading 
him to ally with the traditional Muscat merchant elites, who have been assured 
privileged access to the oil windfall through public contracts. In return, the 
merchant families have helped the ruler to finance his nation-building endeav-
ors. Thus some members of preeminent merchant families have been given 
strategic positions from which they control the distribution of the country’s oil 
wealth. At the same time, as the oil rent has profoundly changed the boundar-
ies between politics and the economy, many ministers whose families were not 
active in the economy before Qaboos’s rule have become personally rich.
This process has not been questioned by the ruler, as it has increased both 
the elites’ loyalty to him and the stability of his rule. The symbolic debt owed 
by Qaboos at the beginning of his rule to those who supported him after 1970 
has thus gradually turned into a weapon in his hands, forestalling any chal-
lenges to his reign by turning them into unfailing allies. On the eve of the Arab 
Spring, few ministers had not personally derived material profit from the oil 
rent.13 From this point of view, rather than encouraging economic mobility, 
which could call into question the established authoritarian order and con-
tribute to a renewal—or at least a revitalization—of the socioeconomic fabric, 
recent privatization and diversification policies have only confirmed Oman’s 
established social and economic hierarchy.
All these trends helped create fertile ground for the development of political 
grievances. In 2005, employees of Sultan Qaboos University in Muscat, as well 
as senior military and civilian officials, were arrested, leading to prison sen-
tences for more than 70 people. Those arrested all belonged to the Ibadi school, 
the third major doctrinal division in Islam (together with the Sunni and Shia 
branches), which is estimated to constitute just over half of the Omani popu-
lation.14 The public prosecution accused them of having been members of a 
banned secret organization that was established in the north of the country. A 
public group thought to be affiliated with the organization ran youth summer 
camps and an underground wing was accused of attempting to overthrow the 
regime by force in order to establish an Ibadi imamate. The accused denied 
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that the organization had a political dimension and they focused on its reli-
gious character and goals, and on the shared desire of its members to “defend 
the Ibadi doctrine.”15 
Meanwhile, embryos of civil society, composed of young Omanis who 
thought their strong educations should allow them to have a voice in the deci-
sionmaking process, started developing—an early, overt sign that growing sec-
tors of society were reluctant to guarantee the perpetuation of a system that 
excluded them from political and economic decisions. New Internet forums 
opened in the mid-2000s, and most participants chose to use their real names, 
even when tackling sensitive issues, with the declared aim of promoting new 
social and political debates in Omani society. Despite the systematic harass-
ment and arrests of Internet activists, online accounts of allegedly fraudulent 
practices by key figures of the regime (but not the ruler) became common. In 
summer 2010, intellectuals and human rights activists took the opportunity of 
the 40th anniversary of Qaboos’s accession to the throne to submit an online 
petition to the ruler calling for wide-scale reforms, such as a new constitution 
that would lead to a parliamentary monarchy and measures against corruption 
among top officials.
Breaking the Fear Barrier 
These warning signs of the approaching storm should have been interpreted 
by the authorities as such. However, the general climate of frustration that 
sparked the fire in 2011 caught the regime by surprise.
On January 17, 2011, 200 people assembled in Muscat to protest against 
government corruption and economic hardship. This was followed in February 
by a series of nationwide protests, each attended by several hundred people 
demonstrating against low salaries, high unemployment, and the lack of legis-
lative powers permitted to the Consultative Council, which had been elected 
by universal suffrage since 2003.
In late February 2011, in the northern town of Sohar, in Oman’s Batinah 
region, young unskilled people from neighboring cities who had been told once 
again that no jobs were available for them started a sit-in at the local branch 
of the Ministry of Manpower. They were evacuated by the police, arrested at 
night, and taken to the town’s central prison. When the news spread, skir-
mishes developed around Sohar’s police station and one protester was shot 
dead. From that moment on, Sohar’s Globe Roundabout, renamed “Reform 
Square” (maydan al-islah), became the gathering place of the protesters. Sit-ins, 
which went on for two months, were organized simultaneously in front of the 
governor’s offices in Salalah, the main town in the southern governorate of 
Dhofar, and in the eastern town of Sur.
For the first time since the end of the Dhofar war in the late 1970s, the 
expression of alternative ideas and informed criticism of state policies was 
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intruding on the streets. Until this point, no latitude of action had been tol-
erated for critics, in the name of preserving national unity behind the ruler 
and preventing the threat of fitna (division). There was also an understanding 
that authorities would use force only in a limited way, in exchange for the 
people’s total noninvolvement in political issues. This tacit arrangement had 
given credence to the idea that “the cost of resisting injustice outweigh[s] that 
of resignation to it.”16 And it had confirmed for most Omanis that politics is a 
dangerous game and that it is possible to enjoy a very satisfying life if they do 
not meddle in it.
The fact that the most important demonstrations took place in the town of 
Sohar, which has a rich trade history going back thousands of years, is highly 
symbolic. Until the early 2000s, Sohar remained a rural provincial town, 
neglected, like other regional centers, by the post-1970 modernization process. 
The lack of employment opportunities in northern Oman (besides local branches 
of government and other public sector posts) helps explain why many Omani 
nationals from Batinah were highly represented in the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) security forces until the beginning of the twenty-first century.17
In this context, the government’s decision to establish an industrial site 
and free zone—conceived by the regime to be an international showcase of 
the country’s economic diversification—was seen as a godsend in Sohar. For 
a planned total investment of $15 billion, the site, which has been in service 
since 2002, was officially projected to generate more than 8,000 direct jobs and 
another 30,000 indirectly in the region by 2015.
Yet as Sohar changed over just a few years from a small, sleepy provincial 
town to the industrial capital of the country, its social fabric disintegrated. 
Inequalities exploded, with pockets of wealth (including luxury gated town-
ships reserved for expatriate executives of industrial groups doing business at 
the port) contrasting sharply with the rest of the area, where residents had no 
access to the economic benefits of the development and experienced a stagna-
tion or a diminution of their living standards due to the cost increases that 
accompanied it. Pollution created by industries in the Sohar port also helped 
trigger local popular frustrations. Epitomizing the tensions brought on by 
the excessive profits that a few regime insiders accumulated during the town’s 
economic boom, Sohar’s main supermarket, Lulu, whose building and land 
belonged to the minister of royal office, Ali al-Maamari, was ransacked and 
burned down in late February.
The now famous “The people want the fall of the regime” sung in Tunis 
and Cairo was appropriated in Oman in 2011, where it was converted to “The 
people want the reform (islah) of the regime” and “The people want the fall 
of corruption” (isqat al-fasad). Other slogans (“Yes to a new Oman,” “We 
need freedom,” and “You may restrict our hands but you cannot restrict our 
dreams in a better life”) openly asked for change. Strikes and demonstrations 
that quickly sprouted up all over the country revolved around demands for 
more job opportunities and measures to curb rising prices and inequalities. 
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Protesters also called on the sultan to personally intervene to end the reign of 
wasta (favoritism) and corruption in the public sector and to put long-serving 
ministers who were widely perceived as corrupt on trial.
In Muscat, a sit-in led by intellectuals and human rights activists in front 
of the Consultative Council marked a symbolic refusal to endorse an elected 
body that was without real power. Demonstrators also called for free and open 
media; the promulgation of a constitution to replace the Basic Law and guar-
antee the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers; and, above 
all, the appointment of a prime minister. Meanwhile, accounts of harassment 
by security forces and violations of basic human rights, as well as denunci-
ations of what critics called a security and police state (dawla al-amn wa-l-
bulis), mushroomed on the Internet. As one intellectual who participated in 
the Muscat sit-in explained in 2012, “Omanis were not silent by choice before 
2011, rather they were silenced by the regime. The Omani population was 
very quiet because of repression and fear: ‘Don’t talk about politics: you will 
be taken behind the sun!’ In 2011, they have managed to break free from the 
sultanate of fear.”18
More generally, while the protests around the country were primarily moti-
vated by social and economic issues, two other dimensions are noteworthy. 
First, although the mobilizations were not organized along sectarian lines or 
focused on sectarian demands, Islamists played a crucial role in channeling 
discontent—probably not so much for the attractiveness of their ideologies per 
se, but rather because they offered one of the few easily identifiable counter-
discourses and forms of collective organization. The influence of underground 
Muslim Brotherhood cells and networks was visible in the Sur, Salalah, and 
Sohar protests, and that of the Salafis could be seen in several Batinah protests, 
particularly those in Sohar and Shinas.19 All of these groups, in addition to 
Ibadis and a significant component of young secular intellectuals, managed to 
coordinate efficiently, especially in Sohar.
Second, the Dakhiliyah (Interior) region, the stronghold of the Ibadi imam-
ate, where poverty is probably as common as it is in Batinah and Dhofar, 
remained untouched by the Omani Spring. More than an Ibadi particularism, 
this immunity is likely explained by Oman’s twentieth-century history. In the 
1950s a conflict arose between the Ibadi imamate, which had controlled the 
interior of Oman since 1920, and Sultan Said bin Taimur, who was backed 
by Britain and whose full sovereignty was restricted to Batinah, Muscat, and 
Salalah. As an Internet activist from the Dakhiliyah region explained, “The 
memory of the war in the 1950s, when the Sultan’s Armed Forces and the 
British destroyed the imamate, is still alive. People in Inner Oman remember 
how bad the al-Busaidis were and know they are all alike,” leaving them hesi-
tant to challenge the current sultan. This is probably not the case in Dhofar, 
where “they have this same memory of the war against the sultan, but it is dif-
ferent because this memory is a good one,” the activist said. “They won the war 
and pushed out Qaboos’s father.”20 
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Given this historical legacy, Qaboos has always been very careful not to 
alienate Inner Oman. In particular, tribal and religious leaders from the region 
have been given prominent positions in the new state and have easy access to 
central authority. People from Inner Oman are overrepresented in all security 
forces, and in the ministries of interior, justice, and heritage and culture. Thus, 
the feeling of abandonment by the central state experienced in the Batinah 
and among other communities since 1970 has been less 
pronounced in the Dakhiliyah region.
Furthermore, unlike in Sohar and Salalah, where the 
social fabric has suffered dramatically from the quick 
transformation from provincial towns into industrial 
cities, the traditional social organization remains solid 
in Inner Oman. This has so far succeeded in balancing 
the growing inequalities and frustrations brought on by 
a poorly executed modernization. Both the mufti of Oman, who is an Ibadi 
from Dakhiliyah, and the Ibadi religious establishment are highly respected, 
and their statements since 1970, unfailingly in favor of the preservation of the 
social and political order, have hardly been contested.
These factors, combined with the memory of the 2005 wave of arrests 
among Ibadi activists, help explain the absence of protests in Inner Oman. 
But in Sohar, Muscat, and elsewhere, the protests thrived, and the regime was 
forced to respond.
The Regime Reacts
Faced with growing discontent, the regime took several steps to appease the 
protesters. The private sector minimum wage for nationals was increased by 
43 percent to about $520 (200 Omani rials) in mid-February 2011. Sultan 
Qaboos made further concessions on February 27, including the introduction 
of a monthly allowance (about $390, or 150 Omani rials) for job seekers, the 
creation of 50,000 new jobs for Omanis in the public sector (predominantly in 
the defense and security sectors), the doubling of the monthly social security 
allowance for eligible needy families, and an increase in student allowances.
In early March, in the largest cabinet reorganization in forty years, Sultan 
Qaboos dismissed one-third of his cabinet, including Ali al-Maamari; the min-
ister of national economy, Ahmed Makki; and the minister of commerce and 
industry, Maqbool al-Sultan. Those decisions were intended to publicly reaf-
firm the sultan’s centrality when it comes to embodying both national unity 
and the struggle against corruption. While positively received, they did little 
to dull the protesters’ resoluteness, much the same way that gestures toward 
Islamists, including the sultan’s approval of the establishment of Islamic banks, 
in May 2011, had little effect.
People from Inner Oman are overrepresented 
in all security forces, and in the ministries of 
interior, justice, and heritage and culture.
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Later in March, the sultan announced his intention to expand the powers of 
the advisory Council of Oman, which is composed of the elected Consultative 
Council (Majlis al-Shura) and an appointed State Council (Majlis al-Dawla), 
and, until this point, had a very limited role. But as Saudi and UAE forces 
entered Bahrain to help quell protests there, it became clear that Qaboos, like 
his counterparts in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), did not intend to go 
beyond what he considered a redline—that is, that the center of political power 
(combining both executive and legislative power) should remain his personal 
prerogative, closed off from any debate. 
The months of April and May showed that repression remained an active 
strategy to choke off dissenting voices: another protester died in clashes with 
the police in Sohar in April. Peaceful gatherings and roundabouts were cleared 
by riot police. Several hundred protesters, journalists, and human rights activ-
ists were arrested all over the country.21 A creeping militarization was imposed, 
with a drastic increase in police controls and checkpoints on roads to the UAE. 
In June and July 2011, more than 100 individuals received jail terms, some for 
up to five years, on charges such as “possessing material with the intention of 
making explosives to spread terror,” “illegal gathering,” and “sabotaging and 
destroying public and private properties.”22
However, it is worth noting that a number of techniques the government 
had used in the past to prevent the emergence of alternative discourses were no 
longer effective.
The repeated labelling of the protesters as scum (raa) and vandals 
(mukharibin) by senior officials and national media showed the regime’s inabil-
ity to accept the legitimacy of those who were expressing alternative opinions 
without accusing them of breaching the public order. The government also 
charged that the protesters were under foreign influence, a well-proven method 
to discredit them and their demands. Following the government’s announce-
ment a few weeks earlier that it had uncovered an Emirati-backed spy network 
that had targeted the Omani leadership,23 security forces circulated text mes-
sages that fueled rumors of supposed Emirati involvement in the organization 
of the Sohar protests. These unfounded allegations failed to attract much atten-
tion, though. 
There were also attempts to buy off individuals thought to be leaders of the 
protests, by offering them money and positions in government departments—
usually without success. Chief executives and human resources departments 
of private companies based in Batinah were contacted directly by police and 
Ministry of Manpower officials and instructed to create (sometimes up to 
50) jobs overnight for “Sohar roundabout’s young people,” whose names they 
received from government officials.24
The authorities also turned to tribal leaders for help in restoring the calm. 
Since the 1970s, Omani authorities have co-opted the tribes and granted their 
leaders gifts in cash and in kind to ensure their loyalty to the regime. Tribal 
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sheikhs, many of whom receive monthly salaries as state employees, have acted 
as intermediaries between the tribes’ members and the state apparatus. This 
was intended to strengthen individuals’ tribal belonging and to prevent the 
emergence of broader political mobilizations.
Interestingly, this manipulation of local identities and tribal issues also 
proved inefficient in 2011. The Ministry of Interior tried to involve tribal 
sheikhs and state representatives in provinces (walis) to appease the protest-
ers on several occasions and to promise youth jobs in security forces. But this 
mediation was blatantly turned down by the protesters, a clear sign that, after 
decades of Qaboos’s co-optation policy, the actual level of prestige and author-
ity enjoyed by tribal leaders had declined sharply. 
It also appears clear that the authorities lacked an accurate understanding 
of the protests. Despite all evidence that overthrowing the regime had never 
been on the protesters’ agenda in 2011, security investigations soon used the 
term opponent (muarid).25 This tactic offered the advantage of discrediting the 
protesters, but the authorities presumably were looking for a rather structured 
underground organization—far from the actual chaotic coordination among 
the different sit-ins and the clumsiness of their actions.
The regime took other steps, as well, aimed at tightening legal provisions 
criminalizing the expression of nonconformist or critical opinions. As early 
as February 2011, a new cybercrime law issued by sultan’s decree imposed jail 
sentences of up to three years for using the Internet to “produce or publish or 
distribute or purchase or possess whatsoever that might violate the public eth-
ics” or “prejudice the public order or religious values.” A few weeks later, the 
prerogatives of the public prosecutor were expanded by sultan’s decree, with 
all the powers held by the inspector general of police and customs assigned to 
the prosecutor. As a leading Omani financial journalist explained, “the public 
prosecutor answers directly to the sultan [now] and can investigate anybody.”26
In May 2011, Sultan Qaboos also expanded the powers of the police, allow-
ing them to detain individuals without an arrest warrant for up to fifteen days 
before bringing them to court—and for up to thirty days without charge “for 
crimes related to national security or mentioned in the antiterrorism law.”
In October 2011, several articles of the penal law were amended by sultan’s 
decree, imposing jail sentences for “the publication of false news, statements 
or rumors liable to incite the public or undermine the prestige of the state 
or weaken trust in its financial state.” A new provision stated that “anyone 
participating in a gathering of at least 10 persons, with an intent to affect the 
public system, can be punished with a jail term of one month to one year.” 
These amendments criminalized the specific character of the protests, even 
down to the methods they used (for example, roadblocks) and the protesters’ 
appearance (for example, wearing masks or veils in a public place or any other 
concealment that prevents identification).
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The same month, in a bid to exert greater control across the country, an 
administrative reorganization transformed all regions into governorates, with 
all governors (except those of Muscat and Dhofar, who have ministerial ranks) 
acting under the strict supervision of the minister of interior.
Limited Institutional Concessions
Even as the regime moved to crack down on dissent, the sultan made several 
concessions designed to emphasize his attentiveness to the public’s aspirations 
for greater participation in decisionmaking.
Forty-six percent of eligible people voted in the 2011 Consultative Council 
election. That turnout, higher than in 2007, was likely a reflection of Omanis’ 
expectations that the council elected that year would advocate for greater 
reform. The 1,133 candidates competed under their own names, because politi-
cal parties and platforms are outlawed by the regime. Indeed, except for the 
fact that candidates had the right to hold public meetings in halls or electoral 
tents for the first time, the 2011 campaign rules were as restrictive as those 
that governed elections in 2003 and 2007. Candidates were allowed to put 
up posters and banners in streets and public places and to advertise on televi-
sion and in newspapers. But they were not permitted to discuss general topics 
(like the role of religion in society or the separation of powers) or to present a 
public campaign together with a candidate from another province, or wilaya. 
Campaigning took place mostly in the meeting rooms (majlis) of tribal sheikhs’ 
houses, but also through door-to-door and personal networks.
As with the 2003 and 2007 elections, clientelism, tribal and ethnic affilia-
tions, and money offered by candidates were also key determinants of voters’ 
choices.27 The only significant outcome of these elections was that three men 
who took part in the protests earlier in the year were elected.
Five days after the vote, the sultan followed through on his March pledge and 
amended the Basic Law to expand the prerogatives of the Council of Oman. 
Previously this body could only question ministers who are not involved in 
national sovereignty (foreign affairs, defense, finance, interior, and oil) and 
submit amendments in the economic, social, and environmental fields to the 
Council of Ministers, which is composed of the members of the cabinet and 
tasked with implementing policies determined by the sultan. The October 2011 
amendments allowed the Council of Oman to draft laws on its own initiative. 
They must be referred for review to the Council of Ministers. In addition, draft 
laws prepared by the Council of Ministers are to be referred to the Council of 
Oman for approval or amendment before being submitted to the ruler, who 
can refer them back to the Council of Oman for reconsideration.
However, these reforms fell far short of widespread expectations that the 
Council of Oman would be transformed into a true legislative body. In partic-
ular, serious restrictions on the Council of Oman’s legislative prerogatives still 
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apply. Laws “which the public interest requires” must be submitted directly to 
the ruler by the Council of Ministers. And the Council of Oman is only per-
mitted to provide recommendations (which the Council of Ministers is free to 
ignore) concerning development projects and the state annual budget, which is 
prepared by a council that the sultan chairs.28
The new amendments gave the Consultative Council the ability to elect its 
own chairman.29 And while it can still question some ministers, who must send 
the body an annual report on their activities, the Consultative Council still 
cannot question ministers involved in national sovereignty. Most importantly, 
the opinions and decisions of these bodies are not binding on the sultan, who 
promulgates laws and can dissolve both chambers.30
At the opening session of the Council of Oman on October 31, the sultan 
made his long-awaited first public address since the start of the protests. But 
his speech contained no major announcements, beyond a promise to combat 
unemployment and corruption, disappointing many.
Nonetheless, after the sultan expanded the powers of the Consultative 
Council, criticism of government policies and the grilling of ministers intensi-
fied, reflecting Omanis’ general distrust of cabinet members. Live coverage on 
the national television channel of these sessions of parliamentary questions 
(and their extensive redistribution on social media) only increased the national 
visibility of these elected representatives, whose changed perception of their 
responsibilities and positions in the general balance of power illustrated a qual-
itative evolution from that of their predecessors.
Some Consultative Council members were determined to use the popular 
legitimacy they derived from the ballot box and to take advantage of the sultan’s 
decision to give the council greater opportunities to express its voice (at least, 
formally), as seen in a 2012 test of strength between the council and the cabinet.
In November of that year, the Consultative Council officially approved the 
formation of a defense, security, and foreign relations permanent committee,31 
covering sovereignty issues that were the cabinet’s undisputed prerogatives. The 
council renewed its mandate in 2013. But while the initiative was blatantly 
rejected by the Council of Ministers, the decision was not formally opposed 
by the ruler. In the post–Arab Spring context, in which cabinet members 
embodied the widespread perception of an elite busy safeguarding its political 
and economic privileges, Qaboos was providing a place for the Consultative 
Council to let off steam. But it was also an unambiguous reminder to cabinet 
members of their political vulnerability and the fact that their political fate 
depends on his goodwill.
A decree from the sultan in October 2011 announced the establishment of 
municipal councils in all eleven governorates (muhafadhat), another step that 
was intended to show Qaboos’s attentiveness to the population’s aspirations 
for greater participation in decisionmaking. Previously only Muscat governo-
rate had a (fully appointed) municipal council. However, this reform had only 
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very limited real impact. Composed of members representing wilayas, who 
are elected by universal suffrage for four-year renewable terms, as well as ex 
officio members representing ministries, the municipal councils are chaired 
by the head of the governorate, who is appointed by the sultan. They have 
only advisory powers, and provide opinions and recommendations only on the 
development of municipal services in the governorate (infrastructure, health, 
local taxes, and so on).
In December 2012, Oman held its first ever municipal elections. Just over 
half of the total 447,500 voters included in the country’s electronic identity 
card system voted. At least 50 candidate applications that were submitted by 
individuals who took part in the 2011 protests were rejected by the election 
committee “on security grounds.”32
In February 2012, the sultan also restructured the Supreme Judicial Council, 
which oversees the judiciary; approves nominations to fill positions in the judi-
ciary, the Administrative Court, and the public prosecution; and proposes 
and reviews draft laws on judicial matters. While the reform increased the 
Supreme Judicial Council’s independence from the minister of justice, it also 
reasserted the sultan’s primacy and control over all these authorities, because 
the Supreme Judicial Council is chaired by the sultan and any decisions it takes 
in his absence must be ratified by the monarch.
In another attempt by the regime to show its determination to fight endemic 
corruption within the state institutions, the prerogatives of the State Financial 
and Administrative Audit Institution (SFAAI) were expanded by sultan’s 
decree. Its expanded mission includes detecting financial and administrative 
irregularities, ensuring transparency in financial and administrative transac-
tions, and providing recommendations on how to avoid conflicts of interest.
The end of 2013 and the spring of 2014 were punctuated by a litany of 
reports announcing prosecutions and convictions of government officials and 
businessmen on various charges related to abuse of office, money launder-
ing, and corruption.33 Approximately 40 civil servants and businessmen have 
been tried in corruption cases since 2013. Among the most prominent people 
to be prosecuted have been the former secretary general of the Ministry of 
National Economy, Mohamed al-Khusaibi; Indian businessman P. Mohamed 
Ali, co-founder of Galfar group, Oman’s largest construction company; and 
the long-serving chief executive of the government-owned Oman Oil, Ahmed 
al-Wahaibi. Despite all the hopes that rested with the SFAAI and its ambitious 
mission, though, people involved in these cases have not been among the big 
economic and political players who had attracted the protesters’ wrath and 
who have embodied the conflict of interest between politics and business since 
the 1970s.
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Continuing Unrest
The combination of political concessions, arbitrary gestures of benevolence, 
and relentless crackdowns on discordant voices was not enough to reassert the 
grip of the state and quell the protests. Popular frustration with the slow pace 
of reform became evident again in May 2012. Around 1,000 oil workers went 
on strike, demanding better pay and working conditions. At the same time, 
protests developed again in Sohar in support of Consultative Council mem-
ber Talib al-Maamari, a forty-year-old Salafi professor of 
Arabic literature at Sohar University who faced calls from 
the public prosecutor that his parliamentary immunity be 
lifted, following postings on his Facebook page that were 
critical of senior officials at the Ministry of Housing. Such 
political activism, and especially his role as a champion for 
victims of Sohar’s industrial area pollution, was crucial in 
his 2011 election to the Consultative Council.
In early June 2012, the public prosecutor, whose brother 
was appointed head of the internal security service with 
the rank of minister by royal decree in May 2013, threatened to take “all appro-
priate legal actions” against writers, bloggers, and sit-in participants who acted 
“against values and morals of the Omani society” and to “prejudice the national 
security and public interests.” A new crackdown on civil society followed in the 
summer of 2012, leading to jail terms (from six to eighteen months) for more 
than 40 individuals on various charges related to “illegal gathering,” “violation 
of information crimes law,” and “defamation of the sultan.” Clashes between 
riot police and local youth around Sohar were so common in 2012 and 2013 
that curfews were imposed and armored vehicles deployed in various areas.
In July 2013, the sultan tried to close the delicate chapter of social and polit-
ical contestation that had been opened two years before—and that authorities 
wanted to consider only an unfortunate parenthesis. On the occasion of the 
43rd anniversary of his accession to the throne, Qaboos pardoned and ordered 
the release of all the individuals who had been sentenced and imprisoned for 
political reasons. The sultan also ordered that those dismissed from private and 
public jobs after the 2011–2012 protests be reinstated.
Yet the intimidation and arbitrary detention of activists have continued and, 
according to Human Rights Watch, basic rights have been “routinely tram-
pled” since then.34 Human rights activist Said Jaddad was arrested again a few 
days after the sultan’s pardon, facing charges of “undermining the status and 
prestige of the state,” following his calls for political and social reforms, and 
contact with foreign human rights bodies. The same month, renewed demon-
strations and blockades of Sohar’s industrial area led to a new crackdown by 
riot police and more arrests.
The combination of political concessions, 
arbitrary gestures of benevolence, and 
relentless crackdowns on discordant 
voices was not enough to reassert the grip 
of the state and quell the protests.
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In May and July 2014, four businessmen and civil servants from Sohar and 
Buraimi, near the UAE border, and two bloggers were arrested and held in a 
secret location. The top editor of the independent online magazine Muwatin, 
Mohamed al-Fazari, who had been released after the sultan’s pardon in March 
2013, was again arrested without a warrant or specific charges in September 
2014.35 This happened one month later to writer and poet Said al-Darudi, fol-
lowing a critical Facebook post,36 and to two other bloggers in November. All 
of them were released after being held for weeks of detention incommunicado 
and without charges. In December, the campaign of intimidation carried out 
by Omani security once again targeted human rights defender Said Jaddad 
and social media activist Hilal al-Busaidi, who had been sentenced in 2012 to 
one year in jail on charges of lèse-majesté. In addition, writer Ali al-Rawahi 
was summoned and detained incommunicado for five days after tweeting 
that Oman had become “a family company managed by thieves and of which 
the people are the clients ignoring their rights and how to claim them.”37 In 
January 2015, Said Jaddad was arrested again and summoned to court to face 
fabricated charges of “undermining the prestige of the state.”
Consultative Council member Talib al-Maamari was sentenced in October 
2014, after more than a year of detention, to three years in jail on charges of ille-
gal gathering and undermining the status and prestige of the state.38 This harsh 
sentence imposed on someone considered a “real political leader” in North 
Batinah appears to be an unequivocal message to members of the Consultative 
Council that the semifreedom of expression tolerated by the regime after 2011 
was no longer permitted,39 and that the existence of a proper parliament in 
Oman, with actual legislative powers, is definitely not on the agenda.
That message appears to have been received. While the grilling of ministers 
had become more virulent following the 2011 elections, it has dramatically 
decreased since Talib al-Maamari’s arrest in August 2013. And, despite evi-
dence of serious financial and administrative irregularities at the Ministry of 
Higher Education provided by local newspapers as early as December 2013,40 
it was not until a year later that the Consultative Council requested that the 
minister appear for questioning. At the same time, one of the most obvious 
illustrations of the Consultative Council’s timid emancipation that had taken 
place after 2011, the defense, security, and foreign relations permanent com-
mittee, has been virtually dormant since 2013.
Labor protests also continued. In October 2013, teachers from government-
run schools throughout the country held a four-week strike, the longest and 
largest on record. At the height of the strike, 35,000 teachers—demanding a 
salary structure based on seniority and the ability to form an elected union41—
were participating and 740 out of 1,047 public schools were shut down.42 A 
few days later, in reaction to strikes that have affected key economic sectors 
of the country since 2012, the minister of manpower issued a new resolu-
tion prohibiting strikes—or the instigation of them—at establishments that 
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provide “essential public services,” that is, oil facilities and refineries, ports, and 
airports.43 However, other strikes in prominent private companies, including 
in the petrochemicals and retail sectors, took place in spring 2014.44
A new Nationality Law (promulgated by sultan’s decree in August 2014) 
gave the state the power to strip Omani nationals of their citizenship if they 
“engage in a group, a party or an organization that adopts principles or doc-
trines that can harm the interests of Oman” or “worked for a foreign country 
in any way whatsoever . . . and failed to fulfil the Omani government’s order to 
abandon such a work within a specified time.”45 These provisions can obviously 
be used to threaten or quell peaceful dissent.
On the social and economic side, as a journalist explained, the regime “has 
been striving by all proper means to prevent a new social conflagration.”46 
While the number of scholarships to study abroad has exploded, the Council 
of Ministers announced in February 2013 a 62 percent increase in the mini-
mum gross salary for nationals working in the private sector, which took effect 
in July 2013.47 Moreover, royal orders were issued in November 2013 to stan-
dardize all grades, salaries, and pension benefits for employees in the public 
sector—all with effect from January 1, 2014. Furthermore, to encourage the 
hiring of more Omani nationals, the Ministry of Manpower decided to stop 
issuing visas to non-Omani workers employed in construction and cleaning 
sectors for a period of six months effective from November 1, 2013.48
A study by the Omani government projected that the public sector wage bill 
in 2014 would jump by as much as $2.3 billion, reflecting a 39 percent increase 
in salaries paid from the state budget. That follows a 70 percent increase in 
government spending between 2011 and 2014.49 
In late 2014 and early 2015, falling oil prices became a new source of pressure. 
The price that the country needs in order to balance its budget was expected to 
nearly double to $97 per barrel in 2014 from $54 on average in 2006–2010, the 
International Monetary Fund said in November 2013.50 While 2014 budget 
plans assumed an average oil price of $85 per barrel, the level expected in the 
2015 budget is $75 per barrel. In these conditions, the 2015 budget anticipates 
a deficit of $6.5 billion, or about 8 percent of the country’s GDP—the coun-
try’s biggest fiscal deficit since 1990.51
Under increasing pressure to expand nonoil revenues and find other ways 
to balance the budget, the cabinet has been considering cutting state subsi-
dies in several areas in 2015, including energy. Consultative Council mem-
bers reacted negatively to such a move and suggested instead imposing a 2 
percent tax on expatriates’ remittances back to their home countries and 
reducing the defense budget.52  
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The Regional Context
While working to combat unprecedented domestic opposition, the regime 
moved throughout this period to shore up its support in the region, where 
protests were also flaring.
Oman has always perceived political instability in the Middle East as a fac-
tor threatening its own internal stability. This perception of political vulner-
ability helps explain the sultanate’s determination to prevent regional actors 
from interfering in its internal affairs. The inescapable corollary of (and price 
for) that desire for regional independence has been Oman’s unquestioned polit-
ical and military dependence on Britain and the United States.
Although British forces officially left Omani bases in 1977, at the end of 
the Dhofar war, these positions were the only ones on the Arabian Peninsula 
used in 1991, and again in 2003, as operational bases by 
the British-U.S. coalition during the air offensives against 
Iraq. The renewal of military cooperation agreements with 
both Britain and the United States in 1985 and 1995, as well 
as joint exercises—including a 2001 exercise in the Omani 
desert, the biggest deployment of British troops abroad since 
the 1980s—only confirmed this Omani strategic depend-
ence. Even if it causes recurrent criticism or frustration in 
other GCC countries and inside Oman, this partnership—
and the military and political protection it provides—is the key that has granted 
the Omani ruler latitude of action within the GCC and at home.
In that environment, Oman’s relations with its neighbors have been governed 
by the determination to prevent the convulsions of the region from impacting its 
internal political status quo. In January 2009, Oman announced that it would 
not join the GCC monetary union. Given the gap in living standards and wages 
between Oman and its wealthier GCC neighbors, a monetary union would have 
had dramatic effects on the Omani economy. This position had no substantial 
damaging effects on Oman’s relationship with its neighbors, however, as shown 
by both the GCC’s decision to set up a $10 billion aid package to help Oman 
cope with protests in March 2011 and Oman’s concomitant support for the 
Saudis’ and Emiratis’ decision to send troops to Bahrain.
Since the short-term emergency that struck all Gulf monarchies in 2011, 
the desire to quell internal pro-democracy movements has taken precedence 
over divergences related to long-term GCC-Iran relations or intra-GCC eco-
nomic cooperation. For example, in preparation for the 34th GCC summit in 
December 2013, the minister responsible for foreign affairs, Yusuf bin Alawi, 
declared that Oman would not prevent the upgrading of the GCC into a union 
of six countries, but would “not be part of it” if it happened. That stance had 
no impact on Oman’s adherence to GCC security imperatives. In January 
2014, Sultan Qaboos ratified the GCC security pact that had been signed 
Oman’s relations with its neighbors have 
been governed by the determination to 
prevent the convulsions of the region from 
impacting its internal political status quo. 
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in November 2012, which strengthens cooperation and mutual assistance in 
security matters. It also allows the hunting down of those who are outside the 
law, or who are wanted by party states, regardless of their nationalities, and the 
integration of signatories’ security apparatuses to provide support to each other 
during times of security disturbances and unrest. And Oman and Kuwait have 
already signed several economic deals, including one worth $1.75 billion in 
November 2014, as part of the $10 billion GCC financial aid pledged in 2011.
Significant investments in the security sector have been a priority in Oman 
since 2011.
Defense and national security forces consumed 36.5 percent of the state’s 
expenditure in 2012, and 11.7 percent of the country’s GDP in 201353—one 
of the world’s highest rates. Oman registered a 51 percent increase in defense 
spending in 2012—the sharpest worldwide.54
The Need to Open a New Chapter
The Omani Spring protests that began in 2011, and the regime’s response to 
them, have revealed how the extreme personalization of Oman’s political sys-
tem since 1970 has reached its limits. That system was for decades the best 
antidote to the emergence of alternative discourses to Sultan Qaboos. But, for 
several years, young generations have not hesitated to question the Renaissance 
ideology. As a civil servant who graduated from Kuwait University explained 
in 2004: “For us, 1970 is dust now, it is history. What matters for us is what 
happens now.” 
The Arab Spring served to sharpen this tension. The official narrative stress-
ing Omanis’ duty of loyalty toward the “father of the nation” seems inaudible 
in a country where 84 percent of the population was born after 1970 and 70 
percent after 1980. It is openly challenged by activists and bloggers who now 
make a clear distinction between the current regime and the Omani nation. 
Their criticism of the ruler’s political decisions and power practices are explic-
itly made in the name of Oman and their concerns for the future of the coun-
try. And, with the sultan’s absence and ill health, and continuing questions 
about the succession process, anxiety about that future is increasing.
Direct criticism of the sultan progressively became more common in the 
protests. In Salalah, demonstrators openly questioned the ruler’s responsibility 
in economic mismanagement (“If you didn’t know [the malpractices], it is a 
disaster; but if you did know, it is an even bigger disaster.”) or threatened him 
in veiled terms, by referring to the Dhofar war and to the political fate of his 
father, who was forced out of power (“The one who forgets the 1970s should 
think of the grandchildren of the free men.”). Online writers and protesters 
who openly criticized the ruler’s practices—namely his proximity to British 
and U.S. interests, and his management of the oil rent and the country, which 
they likened to that of a private firm—were quickly arrested and condemned 
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to jail for lèse-majesté. Activists who were convinced of the ruler’s belief in 
reform before the Arab Spring later expressed their “huge disillusionment” 
with the regime’s response to the society’s call for help. One of the leaders of 
the 2011 Muscat protests put it bluntly: 
In 2011, we wanted to understand what the causes of our country’s disease 
are. We wanted to remove the corrupted elite [around the sultan] from the 
political system and see if this could sort out the problem. We managed to 
make these elites go . . . but we have quickly understood that the body was 
still deeply infected.55
The ruler, who in 2011 fired high-profile ministers who had long served as 
political fodder, has no one left to blame, and no one who can be dismissed in 
order to calm discontent. As one Internet activist from the interior explained:
People’s faith in Sultan Qaboos is still high, however, there is no one else any-
more to blame for the failure of the reforms. That’s why I think that if he will 
appoint a prime minister he will be “Sponge Bob,” just someone who will suck 
all the dissatisfaction which may be directed toward the sultan otherwise.56
The changed status of the sultan was evident in November 2012, when, on 
the occasion of Eid al-Adha, he visited Musandam, along the Strait of Hormuz, 
and Sohar—his first visit to the town since the beginning of the 2011 protests. 
The obvious intention of the trip was to suggest that the general situation was 
back to normal. But the situation on the ground showed just how much had 
changed. The visit was heavily choreographed, with a huge deployment of secu-
rity forces that placed the town under siege, and preemptive questioning of 
young people, who were accused of making fun of the visit with Internet post-
ings that quickly spread on social networks. Even more, graffiti calling for the 
overthrow of the sultan appeared on Sohar walls. The retired senior civil ser-
vant, who insisted that he “loves His Majesty” and “will be loyal and indebted 
[to him] all [his] life,” explained that he was 
not afraid of activists but rather of young poor population who has nothing 
to lose and whose anger can be destructive. . . . Ordinary people don’t believe 
[the sultan] can change anything to the situation. He is perceived as far and 
disconnected from real issues. The old man is alone, terribly alone, he has very 
few friends or people he trusts.57
As one of the Sohar activists summarized, “Qaboos has become somebody 
like anybody else, he can make mistakes like anybody else.”58 This dramatic 
change in the relationship between Omani society and its leadership is the 
most blatant symptom of the unprecedented challenges to the old authoritar-
ian rentier model of development that confront the regime.
With that, and the sultan’s prolonged absence, the nomination of a crown 
prince or a prime minister appears to be a political priority. Many Omanis have 
eagerly awaited such an announcement, which would lay the foundation for 
governance of a post-Qaboos Oman. But the regime has remained reluctant to 
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break the taboo on key issues, including the appointment of a prime minister 
and the country’s future governance, fueling widespread anxiety.
Unlike in other GCC monarchies, Sultan Qaboos has largely excluded his 
extended family from office. At the end of 2014, the sultan had no children and 
had not publicly designated an heir.
Under a succession process that was established in 1996, only Muslim male 
descendants of Qaboos’s great-great-grandfather, Sultan Turki, who are legiti-
mate sons of Omani Muslim parents, are eligible to become sultan. When the 
throne is vacant, the Ruling Family Council is required to meet within three 
days to designate a successor. If the family council fails to choose someone, it falls 
to the Defense Council—together, since a symbolic amendment in 2011, with 
the chairmen of the Consultative Council and the State Council, along with 
three Supreme Court members—to confirm the person that the former ruler 
designated beforehand in a letter addressed to the Ruling Family Council. In 
1997, Sultan Qaboos announced that he had “already written down two names, 
in descending order, and put them in sealed envelopes in two different regions.”59
There has been no shortage of speculation in Muscat for the last twenty years 
about the names that might be on the list. The highest ranking person in offi-
cial protocol, Fahd bin Mahmoud, deputy prime minister for the Council of 
Ministers, whose children’s mother is of French origin, appears unable to claim 
the throne because he cannot plan to pass the kingship to one of them after 
his death. The more probable candidates are thus the three sons of Qaboos’s 
paternal uncle and former prime minister Tariq bin Taimur. Former brigadier 
general Asad bin Tariq, a graduate of Sandhurst, the British military academy, 
who briefly held command of the sultan’s armored corps in the 1990s, has been 
the personal representative of the sultan since 2002. His half-brother Haitham 
served as undersecretary, then secretary general, in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and became minister of national heritage and culture—the position 
he currently holds. Moreover, in December 2013, a sultan’s order appointed 
Haitham chair of the main committee responsible for developing and drafting 
a new long-term national strategy entitled Oman Vision 2040.60 Former rear 
admiral Shihab, a full brother of Haitham, was appointed in 1990 as com-
mander of the Royal Navy, and has served as adviser to the sultan since 2004. 
Asad is said to enjoy support among the military while intelligence services and 
the ruler’s palace office would privilege Haitham.61
Speaking in July 2013, the minister responsible for foreign affairs, Yusuf 
bin Alawi, said the succession process will not lead to a power vacuum in the 
country, but added that the process of appointing a prime minister to support 
Sultan Qaboos in the meantime was a “complex issue.”62 
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Conclusion
The identification of contemporary Oman as a whole with Qaboos, which 
has been the keystone of the regime’s strategy of legitimacy for decades, is 
now openly challenged by activists and bloggers, who make a clear distinction 
between the current regime and the Omani nation. The consequences for the 
ruler himself are massive, as explained by a university teacher: 
I am afraid [the sultan] may squander all he has built and the popular recogni-
tion he has accumulated for forty years. I am supporting the nomination of a 
prime minister or a crown prince as soon as possible, in order for Qaboos to 
keep his image of “Son of God on Earth” that he has built for himself.63
The complexity of the succession mechanism established in the Basic Law, 
combined with the central role played by officials who do not belong to the 
royal family, raises many questions. There is every indication that the Ruling 
Family Council has never met to date. In these circumstances, if the royal 
family cannot make a decision, is it ready to yield supreme decisionmaking to 
individuals who do not belong to the royal family and who owe their positions 
solely to Qaboos?
Moreover, in spite of the precautions taken by the ruler, there appears to be 
a risk that contradictory messages will emerge, creating political confusion. In 
Qaboos’s absence, there does not seem to be any patriarchal 
figure in the Al Said family who could oversee the succession 
process and ensure that disagreements remain contained.
The triptych that has defined contemporary Oman—
the post-1970 Renaissance ideology, the state apparatus, 
and its supreme figure, Sultan Qaboos—cannot be touched 
without putting into question the entire nation-building 
project that he undertook. This model of legitimacy, based 
on the extreme personalization of the political system, is 
intimately linked to the person of Qaboos and to him only.
Tremendous social and economic challenges await Qaboos’s successor. But 
Oman’s young civil society will not be willing to grant him the same degree 
of authoritarian paternalism that their parents gave Qaboos. The use of the 
oil rent as an emergency job and subsidy faucet; the firing of dignitaries as 
scapegoats who were made responsible for the system’s failings; and the ruler’s 
arbitrary gestures of goodwill, a way to enhance his legitimacy and publicly 
reaffirm his centrality to the maintenance of national unity—all of these tools 
have proved to be partially unsuccessful since 2011.
The regime’s repressive measures after 2012 resulted again in what the United 
Nations special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
of association called in September 2014 a “pervasive culture of silence and fear 
affecting anyone who wants to speak and work for reforms in Oman.”64 That 
response only confirms the authorities’ disarray in the face of a development they 
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can no longer stop: the flourishing criticism of the elite’s political management of 
this critical juncture in Oman’s history. These grievances are made explicitly in 
the name of Oman and out of concern for the future of the country.
There is no doubt that the ruler’s short television address from Germany in 
November 2014 provided a feeling of temporary relief to many, who are well 
aware of the considerable turmoil his sudden demise may provoke. However, 
the dramatic change in the relationship between the society and its leadership 
confronts the Qaboos State with unprecedented questions whose answers can 
no longer be delayed.
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